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STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL 
1. Was the court below correct in its holding that th 
appellants7 alleged cause of action, which according to the 
undisputed facts arose in 1973, is barred by the statute of 
limitations of the Utah Health Care Malpractice Act? 
2c Is the Utah Health Care Malpractice Act, and the 
statute of limitations associated therewith, constitutional? 
STATEMENT OF CASE 
This action, filed by appellants (plaintiffs) on 
October 8, 1985, alleges respondents (defendants) were negligent 
in providing medical care to the mincbr plaintiff Jennifer 
Chapman. The plaintiffs claim that two doctors, a nurse and the 
named hospital entities committed medical malpractice during 
February 1973, more than twelve years prior to filing their 
action. Appellants allege that the appropriate statute of 
limitations should be tolled because the two doctors continued t 
provide care to Jennifer. Appellants also attempt to toll the 
statute of limitations by invoking a provision in the Utah Healt 
Care Malpractice Act which provides that if a health care 
provider affirmatively acts to fraudulently conceal alleged 
misconduct, the running of the statute is tolled until such tim<= 
as the plaintiff knew or should have known of the alleged 
misconduct. 
In December 1985, defendant Garth Myer, M.D. filed a 
motion to dismiss and defendants L. George Veasy, M.D., Karen 
Bowman, R.N., and the hospital defendants moved for summary 
judgment and dismissal. (R. 38, 88.) These motions were heard 
before the Honorable Homer F. Wilkinson on February 5, 1986. 
After taking the matter under advisement, Judge Wilkinson grant* 
defendants' motions for summary judgment and dismissal. (R. 2 6' 
282.) Plaintiffs' appeal followed. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Jennifer Chapman, now 14-years old, was born on Augusi 
10, 1972, and was treated for "blue spells" by doctors in Ogden 
for the first five to seven months of her life. She was then 
referred to the Primary Children's Medical Center and was 
admitted by defendant L. George Veasy, M.D. (R. 141.) 
On or about February 14, 1973, an operation to instal 
a device called a Waterston Shunt was performed by a doctor who 
was not a named defendant. The purpose of that operation was t< 
increase the flow of blood to Jennifer's lungs. The operation 
"over-corrected" the initial problem and on February 28, 1973 a 
second operation was performed to modify the shunt. (R. 141.) 
A few hours after the operation Jennifer suffered a 
cardiac arrest while she was in the recovery room. Resuscitati 
efforts saved Jennifer's life, but it was determined immediatel 
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thereafter that she had sustained severe and irreversible brain 
damage. (R. 141-142.) 
In the months and years following Jennifer's cardiac 
arrest in 1973, her parents (plaintiflfs) had several discussions 
and considerable correspondence with defendant Veasy. On severa. 
of those occasions they alleged that medical negligence during 
her hospital stay at the Primary Children's Medical Center in 
February of 1973 caused Jennifer's impaired condition. (R. 107, 
A-2; R. 256-257, A-20-A-21.) These facts are supported by the 
affidavit of Dr. Veasy and were not disputed by plaintiffs. 
As an example and as eviderice of such allegations of 
negligence made by the Chapmans, Dr. Veasy was able to produce a 
hand-written letter from Robert Chapirtan to him which he received 
sometime prior to May 2, 1977. (See Exhibit "K" to Affidavit of 
L. George Veasy, M.D., and typed version immediately following 
Exhibit "A". R. Ill, A-6.) Appellarit Chapman wrote in his 
letter that the "negligence is obvious". (R. 117, A-12.) 
Frequently since 1973 Dr. Veasy participated in 
providing or coordinating medical care for Jennifer Chapman at 
the request of her parents Robert ChApman and Teresa Chapman. 
Based on his personal conversations and correspondence with the 
Chapmans, Dr. Veasy said under oath that, "I know and state that 
continuously since 1973 [the Chapman^] have believed, albeit 
erroneously, that the episode which Jennifer Chapman experienced 
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at Primary Children's Medical Center in February 1973 was 
preventable and resulted from medical negligence by those who 
attended her." (R. 108, A~3.) 
Between November of 1977 and July of 1985, plaintiffs 
conferred with at least five different attorneys before their 
present counsel became involved. It is undisputed that various 
attorneys representing the plaintiffs have contacted the 
defendants regarding claims now asserted in plaintiffs7 complai 
(Re 257, A-21), including but not limited to attorney Richard D 
Burbidge who contacted defendants in November 1977 and attorney 
Stephen G. Crockett who contacted defendants in January 1979, 
plus attorneys representing at least five additional law firms 
thereafter. (R. 108, 109, A-3, A-4.) 
The events related in an affidavit of Scott Olsen wer 
also uncontradicted by the appellants. (R. 249, A-14e) 
Essentially, Mr. Olsen, the manager of Scott Wetzel Services, 
Inc., an insurance adjustment agency in Salt Lake City, Utah, 
related that on several different occasions the Chapmans had 
asserted the same medical malpractice claims as now raised in 
their present complaint. As he related, on May 27, 1983 he 
personally met with Robert and Teresa Chapman, with Jennifer al 
present. At that time the Chapmans alleged that Jennifer had 
been injured in February 1973 in connection with problems that 
developed following the second cardiac operation, because there 
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had not been a prompt response to Jennifer's cardiac arrest. 
(R. 250, A-15.) 
On July 13, 1983 Robert Chapman again phoned Mr. Olsen 
again alleging that injury to his daughter Jennifer in connectioi 
with heart surgery at Primary Children's Medical Center in 
February 1973 was the result of negligence by Dr. Veasy, Dr. 
Myers, Primary Children's Medical Center and/or some of its 
employees. He was advised that Mr. Olsen's office had set up a 
file on this matter in 1978 when Dr. Veasy had met with the 
Chapmans and their attorney, Stephen Crockett, concerning their 
claims against Primary Children's Medical Center and others; tha 
his office had reviewed the Chapman'$ claims at that time, and 
had concluded there was no negligence or liability. (R. 250, A-
15.) In both the claims registered by the Chapmans in 1978 and 
1983, they alleged the same malpractice, that is, that Jennifer 
had suffered brain damage by a hypoxic insult that was due to th 
failure of Nurse Bowman to recognize the alleged cardiac arrest 
of Jennifer Chapman. (R. 253, A-18.} 
In December 1985 after plaintiffs' present counsel 
filed suit, counsel for defendants mbved for summary judgment 
alleging, among other things, that plaintiffs' alleged causes oi 
action were barred by the applicable statute of limitations 
contained in the Utah Health Care Malpractice Act. (R. 38, 
-5-
88.) The court subsequently granted summary judgment in favor 
all defendants. (R. 282.) 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
In 1976 the Utah Legislature enacted the Utah Health 
Care Malpractice Act to protect the public from adverse effects 
of the rising incidents and cost of medical malpractice claims. 
This Court on several prior occasions has upheld that the 
constitutionality of the Act, including the statute of 
limitations. 
It is well-settled that it is within the Legislature's 
prerogative to determine whether a statute of limitations cipplis 
or is tolled with respect to minors' claims. Minors have no 
inherent constitutional exemption from the operation of a statut 
of limitations. The legislative intent in this instance is 
unequivocally clear that in the public's interest minors7 claims 
against health care providers must be timely filed. Legislative 
intent distinguishes this circumstance from the court decisions 
in other cases upon which appellants rely. 
In harmony with federal and foreign state decisions, 
this Court has consistently applied a rational basis test to 
determine if a statute unconstitutionally denies guarantees of 
equal protection and access to courts. The Court has previously 
determined that the Legislature may properly treat health care 
providers as a separate class, and it is abundantly clear that 
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equal treatment of minors and adults with respect to operation of 
the statute of limitations reasonably furthers the Legislature's 
objectives. Thus, Utah Code Ann, § 7^-14-4 is constitutional. 
The claims asserted in this lawsuit, Commenced more than twelve 
years after the incident giving rise to the plaintiffs' claims, 
are barred as a matter of law. 
ARGUMENT 
I. APPELLANTS' CAUSE OF ACTION IS BARRED BY SECTION 
78-14-4 UTAH CODE ANNOTATED (STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS). 
Because appellants' claims are premised on allegations 
of medical negligence, the applicabl0 statute of limitations is 
set forth in the Utah Health Care Malpractice Act, § 78-14-4 Uta 
Code Annotated, which states: 
(1) No malpractice action against a health care 
provider may be brought unless it is commenced within 
two years after the plaintiff or patient discovers, or 
through the use of reasonable diligence should have 
discovered the injury, whichever first occurs, but not 
to exceed four years after the date of the alleged act 
omission, neglect or occurence, except that: 
(b) In an action where it is alleged that a patien 
has been prevented from discovering misconduct on the 
part of a health care provider because that health car 
provider has affirmatively acted to fraudulently 
conceal the alleged misconduct, the claim shall be 
barred unless commenced within one year after the 
plaintiff or patient discovers, or through the use of 
reasonable diligence, should have discovered the 
fraudulent concealment, whichever first occurs. 
(2) The provisions of this section shall apply to all 
persons, regardless of minbrity or other legal 
disability under section 7B-12-36 or any other 
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provision of the law, and shall apply retroactively t< 
all persons, partnerships, associations and 
corporations and to all health care providers and to 
all malpractice actions against health care providers 
based upon alleged personal injuries which occurred 
prior to the effective date of this act; provided, 
however, that any action which under former law could 
have been commenced after the effective date of this 
act may be commenced only within the unelapsed portioi 
of time allowed under former law; but any action whic] 
under former law could have been commenced more than 
four years after the effective date of this act may b< 
commenced only within four years after the effective 
date of this act. 
Because section 78-14-4 Utah Code Annotated applies "* 
all persons regardless of minority or other legal disability an< 
shall apply retroactively," the only exception that could be 
claimed here is the provision that: 
any action which under former law could have been 
commenced after the effective date of this act 
[April 2, 1976] may be commenced only within the 
unelapsed portion of time allowed under former law; bi 
any action which under former law could have been 
commenced more than four years after the effective dal 
of this act may be commenced only within four years 
after the effective date of this act* 
Section 78-14-4(2). 
Accordingly, the maximum extended time within which 
appellants' claims could be brought by reason of Jennifer 
Chapman's minority would be through April 2, 1980, or four year* 
after the effective date of the Utah Health Care Malpractice Aci 
There remains only the question of whether the 
appellants had sufficient knowledge or information concerning 
what they now perceive as "legal injury" to Jennifer to trigger 
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the running of the statute. The undisputed facts found within 
Dr. Veasy's affidavits and the appellants' own affidavits and 
correspondence confirm they were adequately apprised of the 
"legal injury" they now complain of Hnd that the statute of 
limitations commenced running as eariy as February 1973 and no 
later than May 1977. 
The appellants7 allegation of fraudulent concealment i 
a shallow attempt to cover up the stile claim. All of the facts 
in the complaint filed in 1985 were known or could readily have 
been known in 1973. An allegation of fraudulent concealment doe 
not toll a statute of limitations if reasonable inquiry on the 
part of the plaintiffs would have reyealed the claimed fraud 
prior to the time of filing their cotnplaint. Rasmussen v. Qlser 
583 P.2d 50, 52 (Utah 1978); McConki^ v. Hartman, 529 P.2d 801, 
802 (Utah 1974). 
Further, by its language, § 78-14-4(1)(b) states that 
even where it is claimed that the patient has been prevented frc 
discovering misconduct of a health care provider because of thai 
provider's affirmative and fraudulent concealment, "the claim 
shall be barred unless commenced within one year after plaintif: 
or patient discovers, or through the use of reasonable diligenc< 
should have discovered the fraudulent concealment . . . ." 
(Emphasis added.) Knowledge of the parent-plaintiff is imputed 
to the minor patient. See Hargett v. Limberg, 598 F.Supp. 152, 
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155 (D. Utah 1984), reversed on other grounds, F.2d (10 
Cir. 1986)• The undisputed facts show that plaintiff had 
sufficient knowledge prior to 1977. 
It is well established under Utah law that in medical 
negligence cases the statute of limitation begins running when 
the claimant has reason to believe that legal injury exists. S< 
Foil v. Ballinger, 601 P.2d 144, 148 (Utah 1979). Under Foil, 
and its progeny, a legal determination of negligence is not 
necessary to start the statute of limitations. Rather, the 
crucial question is whether the plaintiff was aware of the fact, 
that would lead a reasonable person to conclude that he may hav< 
a cause of action against the health care provider. See, e.g., 
Reiser v. Lohner, 641 P.2d 93, 99 (Utah 1982) (knowledge of 
husband that the wife was suffering disorders as the result of 
incident, whether temporary or permanent, showed that plaintiff 
should have known that they had suffered legal injury at the tii 
of the cardiac arrest); Hove v. McMaster, 621 P.2d 694, 696 (Ut< 
1980). 
In Hargett v. Limberg, supra, the court found the 
mother of an injured minor had not directly accused the treatin< 
physician of negligence but had told another doctor she felt th< 
treating physician had been negligent. Such was sufficient to 
commence the running of the statute and to require diligent 
followup on the parent's feelings that medical negligence had 
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caused injury to her child. Similarly, in this case Jennifer 
Chapman's father wrote to Dr. Veasy in 1977: 
Now I am well aware that I am not qualified medically 
or legally to answer all tl^ e questions pertaining to a 
malpractice suite [sic]. The way I understand the law 
the burden of proof is on itje to prove both negligence 
and physical damage. The riegligence is obvious but to 
what extent the physical damage can be linked to this 
negligence only a man of yqur medical knowledge can 
know for sure. I do know tjhat besides being mentally 
and physically handicaped Jennifer also has an enlarge-
heart making it impossible for her to ever lead any 
kind of normal active life and eventually will be the 
cause of her death. She was hurt and hurt bad because 
of wrong decisions made in her early life. The laws i 
the state of Utah allow foif compensation for pain and 
suffering . . . . Before too long my atorney will be 
in contact with you and I ^ isk that you realize that he 
represents Jennirers interests and set aside your 
feeling toward the legal profession. . . . (Emphasis 
added, spelling as in original.) 
(R. 117-118, A-12, A-13.) 2-3.] 
Other undisputed evidence shows appellants discovery c 
the alleged medical negligence. For example, appellants engaged 
the services of at least two (and probably more) attorneys prior 
to April 2, 1980 to evaluate appellants' claims. As agents for 
appellants, said attorneys had ample opportunity and access to 
appropriate discovery procedures to inake a timely pursuit of 
appellants' claims or further explorb their merit. One attorney 
filed a medical malpractice action against the doctors who had 
treated Jennifer before she was transferred to Primary Children 
Hospital. (R. 143.) Accordingly, appellants were well aware o: 
sufficient facts to commence running of the statute of 
limitations which now bars their claims. 
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II. THE STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS IS NOT TOLLED BY ESTOPPEL 
BY A CONTINUING PHYSICIAN-PATIENT RELATIONSHIP, 
Respondents ask the Court to look through appellants' 
excessively lengthy effort to cloud the key issue presently 
before the court: namely, whether under the undisputed facts t 
statute of limitations bars the appellants' action. Appellants 
have interjected the judicially developed issues of estoppel an 
a continuing physician-patient relationship in an attempt to 
avoid the statute of limitations. With regard to such issues, 
the applicable law in a Utah medical malpractice action has bee 
codified within the Utah Health Care Malpractice Act. 
Regarding the principles generally applicable to 
estoppel, the Utah Medical Malpractice Act now provides that: 
(b) In an action where it is alleged that a 
patient has been prevented from discovering 
misconduct on the part of a health care provider 
because that health care provider has 
affirmatively acted to fraudulently conceal the 
alleged misconduct, the claim shall be barred 
unless commenced within one year after the 
plaintiff or patient discovers, or through the use 
of reasonable diligence should have discovered the 
fraudulent concealment, whichever first occurs. 
Utah Code Annotated §78-14-4(1)(b). The statute takes into 
account reliance by a patient or plaintiff on the representatio 
of a physician. The language supersedes any general concepts o 
estoppel that have developed in other jurisdictions. 
The statute of limitations is also not tolled by the 
existence of a continuing medical relationship between a 
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physician and patient. Appellants, tior support, have cited the 
1932 decision of Peteler v. Robison, 81 Utah 535, 17 P.2d 244 
(Utah 1932) . Appellants claim the "ntajority" of jurisdictions 
support appellants7 theory. Appellants, however, have 
misunderstood or misstated the general rule and have not read 
Peteler accurately. The general rule, that continuing physician 
patient relationship tolls the statute of limitations for medica 
negligence until that relationship is terminated, only applies 
where malpractice has been occurring throughout the continuous 
and substantially uninterrupted courie of treatment for a 
particular illness. It never applies where the patient has 
discovered, or through the use of reasonable diligence should 
have discovered, the injury, despite any continuing treatment. 
See Oliver v. Kaiser Community Health Foundation, 449 N.E.2d 438 
443-444 (Ohio 1983); Lopez v. Swyer, 115 N.J. Super. 237, , 
279 A.2d 116, 123 (1971) ("if a defendant doctor is guilty of 
negligent conduct, whether of commission or omission, in a 
continuing course of treatment, the statute does not ordinarily 
begin to run until the injurious treatment is terminated unless 
the patient discovered or should have discovered the injury in 
its causal connection with the negligent treatment before that 
time.") See also A.L.R. 2d 368, § 6[c] (as supplemented). 
Appellants7 only specific allegation of negligent 
treatment occurred in February 1973, from which Jennifer 
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"suffered from extreme lack of oxygen and sustained permanent 
brain damage." (R. 6.) Under the undisputed facts, any claimed 
medical malpractice was thus complete at the time of the Februa 
1973 injury. Even if continuing negligence were adequately 
alleged, the statute still runs from the time of discovery of tl 
injury and not from the termination of a physician-patient 
relationship. 
Note that even the Peteler court decision relied on b] 
the appellants recognized that where negligent treatment is not 
continuing, the statute of limitations bar would be complete. 
See Peteler v. Robison, 81 Utah 535, , 17 P.2d at 249. To tl 
extent that Peteler could be read to hold otherwise, it was 
specifically disapproved in Christiansen v. Rees, 20 Utah 2d 19( 
436 P.2d 435 (1968). The statute of limitations thus bars the 
appellants' action. 
III. THE UTAH HEALTH CARE MALPRACTICE ACT AND ITS STATUTE ( 
LIMITATIONS ARE CONSTITUTIONALLY SOUND. 
Appellants have devoted the greater part of their bri< 
to attacking the constitutionality of the Utah Health Care 
Malpractice Act statute of limitations. A review of pertinent 
case law will show that every Utah court which has tested the 
constitutionality of the Act under the theories raised by 
appellants has rejected the same constitutional arguments which 
appellants now assert. 
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A* Utah Case Law Precedents, 
In reaching its decision to uphold Utah Code Annotated 
§ 78-14-4, the Court can rely on a lohg line of Utah Supreme 
Court decisions which have strongly afrd consistently upheld the 
provisions of the Health Care Malpractice Act, including its 
statute of limitations, against constitutional challenges. See, 
e.g., Allen v. Intermountain Health Cbre, Inc., 635 P.2d 30 (Utat 
1981); Yates v. Vernal Family Health Center, 617 P.2d 352 (Utah 
1980); McGuire v. University of Utah Medical Center, 603 P.2d 78( 
(Utah 1979); Vealey v. Clegg, 579 P.2d 919 (Utah 1978). 
Federal courts reviewing constitutional challenges to 
the Utah Health Care Malpractice Act have also uniformly upheld 
the validity of § 78-14-4. See, e.g., Vest v. Bossard, 700 F.2d 
600 (10th Cir. 1983); Hargett v. Limflerg, 598 F.Supp. 152 (D. 
Utah 1984). 
This Court's decision in Aljlen v. Intermountain Health 
Care, Inc., supra, is typical of the support the Court has given 
to enactments by the Utah Legislature in the area of medical 
malpractice. In Allen the Court unanimously rejected the 
plaintiff's argument that the shortened statute of limitations 
for medical malpractice cases violates constitutional guarantees 
of equal protection. The Court held that: (1) the Utah 
"legislature exercised its discretionary prerogative in 
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determining that the shortening of the statute of limitations 
. . . would insure the continued availability of health care 
services,"; and (2) such action does not exceed constitutional 
prohibitions. 635 P.2d at 32 (footnote omitted). 
Appellants apparently acknowledge that Allen was 
properly decided (Appellants7 Brief at 32) and that the 
Legislature may rationally limit the time for filing malpractio 
claims as to adults, but argue it may not so limit minor's 
claims. Appellants7 argument overlooks, however, the fundament 
principle that the legislature may place minors on equal footin 
with adults without infringing their constitutional rights. As 
explained in Vance v. Vance, 108 U.S. 514 (1883): 
The Constitution of the United States . . . gives 
to minors no special rights beyond others, and it 
is within the legislative competency of the State 
. . . to make exceptions in their favor or not. 
The exemptions from the operation of statutes of 
limitation, usually accorded to infants and 
married women, do not rest upon any general 
doctrine of the law that they cannot be subjected 
to their action, but in every instance upon 
express language in those statutes giving them 
time after majority . . . to assert their rights. 
Id. at 521. See also Grellet v. City of New York, 504 N.Y.S.2d 
671, 673 (A.D.2 Dept. 1986) (medical malpractice action not 
tolled by plaintiff7s infancy); Licano v. Karusnick, 663 P.2d 
1066, 1068 (Colo. App. 1983) (the legislature is the primary 
judge of whether the time period allowed to a minor is 
reasonable); Rohrabaugh v. Wagoner, 274 Ind. 661, 413 N.E.2d 
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891, 893 (1980) (legislature is not ufader any constitutional 
mandate to suspend operation of statutes of limitation in cases 
of infancy or incapacity); 51 Am, Jur. 2d 750, Limitation of 
Actions § 182 (1970) (minority does not per se bestow immunity 
upon an infant or his guardian without a legislative saving in 
his favor, and a statute of limitations will ordinarily run 
against the claims of infants in the absence of a contrary 
statute). 
This principle was reaffirmed by the decision of the 
United States District Court for the District of Utah in Hargett 
v. Limberg, 598 F.Supp. 152 (D. Utah 1984). In that decision tin 
federal court granted summary judgment in favor of the defendant 
health care providers, holding that the minor plaintiff's claim 
was barred by the medical malpractice statute of limitations. I 
doing so the court considered and rejected the same constitu-
tional attack the appellants have launched in their opposition t 
these defendants' motions. The court's opinion recognizes as 
"universally accepted" the rule that a "legislature may put 
adults and infants on the same footirig with respect to statutes 
of limitation without affecting constitutional rights." Id. at 
156. 
Other federal courts have teached the same conclusion 
with respect to operation of the statute of limitations against 
minors' claims under the Federal Tort Claims Act. See, e.g., 
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Robbins v. United States, 624 F.2d 971, 972 (10th Cir. 1980) 
("It is well established that a claimant's minority does not to] 
the running of the statute of limitations under the Federal Tort 
Claims Act"); Brown v. United States, 353 F.2d 578, 579 (9th Cii 
1965) (minority does not toll the statute of limitations, and 
parents or guardians of a minor must preserve a claim by timely 
action); Pittman v. United States, 341 F.2d 739, 741 (9th Cir.)/ 
cert, denied, 382 U.S. 941 (1965) (equal protection guarantees 
are not violated by applying a shortened statute of limitations 
to a minor's claim). 
Sound state and federal case precedents clearly show 
that the statute of limitations of the Utah Health Care 
Malpractice Act, which places adults and minors on equal footinc 
is a constitutional exercise of legislative prerogative and a 
rational response to the stated legislative purpose of addressir 
a crisis in the availability of medical malpractice insurance ar 
its attendant effect upon the quality of health care in the Stat 
of Utah. Utah Code Ann. § 78-14-2 (1977). 
B. Scott v. School Board of Granite School District Did 
Not Invalidate the Medical Malpractice Statute of 
Limitations as Applied to Minors# Claims. 
The primary thrust of appellants' argument is that th< 
Court has already declared the statute of limitations of 
§ 78-14-4 as applied to minors unconstitutional in Scott v. 
School Board of Granite School District, 568 P.2d 746 (Utah 
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1977). The statutory provision at isgue in Scott was Utah Code 
Ann. § 63-30-13 (1977), the notice of claim provision of the Utai* 
Governmental Immunity Act, Utah Code Ann. § 63-30-1 et seq. 
(1977). Appellants contend that the sweeping dictum "in all 
cases" contained in the Court's opinion invalidated not only 
§ 63-30-13, but all provisions which limit the effect of the 
general tolling provision for minor's claims set forth in Utah 
Code Ann. § 78-12-36(1) (1977). 
Appellants' reading of Scott overstates the Court's 
holdingo Scott is not a case of constitutional dimension; it is 
rather, an example of judicial interpretation of statutes to 
further the Legislature's intent and objectives. 
A line of Utah cases prior to Scott had held that the 
tolling provisions of § 78-12-36 did not excuse a minor's failure 
to timely file the notice of claim required by § 63-30-13 before 
commencing an action against a political subdivision of the 
state. See, e.g., Varoz v. Sevey, 29 Utah 2d 158, 506 P.2d 435 
(1973) . 
In 1973, the Utah legislature amended Utah Code Ann. 
§ 10-7-77, a notice of claim provision relating to certain claim 
against cities or incorporated towns which was similar in conten 
and effect to § 63-30-13.1 The amendment provided: 
xSection 10-7-77 was later repealed by Laws 1978 ch. 27, 
§ 12. 
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If the person for whom a claim is made is a minor, th< 
the claims covered by this section may be so presentee 
within the time limits specified above or within one 
year after the person reaches the age of majority, 
whichever is longer. 
In Scott the Court found that this amendment, coupled 
with the Legislature's enactment of the general tolling provisic 
in § 78-12-36(1), made it "abundantly clear" that the Legisla-
ture's general intent at that time was to protect minors' claim* 
against governmental entities. 568 P.2d at 748. Given that 
legislative intent, and the similarities between the two notice 
of claim provisions, the Court was unable to find any reason fo] 
the 1973 Legislature's failure to similarly amend § 63-30-13. 
The Court therefore held that the legislative intent which 
resulted in the amendment of § 10-7-77 also applied to § 63-3 0-
and the minor's claim should be preserved. The Court did not 
declare § 63-3 0-13 unconstitutional, but simply overruled a pri< 
line of cases in deference to what the Court perceived to be a 
new expression of legislative grace in favor of minors. 
The Scott decision is consistent with the Utah Supreme 
Court's prior rulings concerning judicial review of legislative 
enactments. The Court has stated that its primary responsibili 
and purpose in interpreting statutory enactments is to give 
effect to the underlying legislative intent. Millett v. Clark 
Clinic Corp., 609 P.2d 934, 936 (Utah 1980). The Court has als* 
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stated that it will avoid constitutional questions wherever 
possible: 
The right and power of the judiciary to declare 
whether legislative enactments exceed constitu-
tional limitations is to be exercised with 
considerable restraint and in conformity with 
fundamental rules. One such fundamental rule of 
long-standing is that unnecessary decisions are to 
be avoided and that the codrt should pass upon the 
constitutionality of a statute only when such a 
determination is essential to the decision in a 
case. . . . An attack on the validity of a 
statute cannot be made by parties whose interest 
have not been, and are not about to be, prejudiced 
by the operation of the statute. 
A further fundamental rule is that the courts do 
not busy themselves with advisory opinions, nor is 
it within their province to exercise the delicate 
power pronouncing a statute unconstitutional in 
abstract, hypothetical, or otherwise moot cases. 
It has been found to be far wiser, and it has 
become settled as a qeneral principle, that a 
constitutional question is not to be reached if 
the merits of the case in tiand may be fairly 
determined on other than constitutional issues. 
Hoyle v. Monson, 606 P.2d 240, 242 (Utah 1980). 
The Scott decision is consistent with these rules of 
judicial review. The decision interpreted and gave full effect 
to the perceived legislative intent. It did not, however, 
invalidate the notice of claim statute, nor did the Court review 
and pass upon the constitutionality <j>f any other statutory 
provision not before the Court. 
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IV. SECTION 78-14-4 IS A CONSTITUTIONALLY PERMISSIBLE 
ENACTMENT. 
A party who challenges a legislative enactment on 
constitutional grounds bears a heavy burden of proof. Judicial 
review of a properly enacted law begins with the strong 
presumption that the law is constitutional. State v. Murphy, 6 
P.2d 1220, 1222 (Utah 1983). This Court has consistently 
observed that it is not the function of the judiciary to second 
guess the wisdom or propriety of legislation. 
But the wisdom or propriety of the legislation is 
not for us to consider . . . "there is, without 
doubt, plenty of room, within the pale of the 
Constitution, for ill-advised legislation. . . . 
That is a matter between the people and the 
representatives." . . . Within the limits of the 
Constitution it is the prerogative of the legisla-
ture to control such matters, and the fact that an 
act may be ill-advised or unfortunate, if such it 
be, does not give rise to an appeal from the 
Legislature to the courts for correction. . . . 
Under our system of government it is important 
that each branch thereof avoid infringement upon 
the prerogatives of the other. 
Hansen v. Public Employees Retirement Sys. Bd. of Admin., 122 
Utah 44, 246 P.2d 591, 599 (1952) [citations omitted]; see also 
Minnesota v. Cloverleaf Creamery Co., 449 U.S. 456, 101 S. Ctc 
715, 66 L.Ed. 2d 659 (1981). By judicial mandate this court mu 
not interfere with the Legislature's exercise of its prerogativ 
unless a constitutional infringement is clearly established. 
Zamora v. Draper, 635 P.2d 78, 80 (Utah 1981). 
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A. Standard of Review, 
Appellants7 challenge the constitutionality of 
§ 78-14-4 as applied to minors on two grounds: (1) the provisior 
violates guarantees of equal protection of laws found within the 
United States and Utah Constitutions; and (2) the provision 
violates Article I, Section 11 of the Utah Constitution relating 
to a litigant's right of access to the courts. The rational 
basis standard of review is the appropriate standard for decidinc 
both of appellants' constitutional challenges. See Malan v. 
Lewis, 693 P.2d 661, 674 n. 14 (Utah 1984) (equal protection 
rational basis analysis applies to review of rights guaranteed b] 
Article I, Section 11 of the Utah Constitution). 
1. Equal protection. 
The equal protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendmen 
of the United States Constitution and Article 1, Section 24 of 
the Utah Constitution embody the sam0 fundamental principle: 
"Persons similarly situated should b4 treated similarly, and per 
sons in different circumstances should not be treated as if thei 
circumstances were the same." Malan v. Lewis, supra, at 669. 
zArticle I, Section 11 provides: "All courts shall be open 
and every person, for an injury done to him in his person, 
property or reputation, shall have remedy by due course of law, 
which shall be administered without denial or unnecessary delay; 
and no person shall be barred from prosecuting or defending 
before any tribunal in this state, by himself or counsel, any 
civil cause to which he is a party." 
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A statute may treat groups differently and still meet 
constitutional equal protection and access to the courts 
requirements if: (1) the law applies equally to all persons 
within a class; and (2) the statutory classifications and dif-
ferent treatment given the classes have a reasonable tendency t< 
further the objectives of the statute. Malan v. Lewis, supra, < 
670. 
The rational basis standard of review cited above has 
been used by the Utah Supreme Court in all its prior reviews of 
the medical malpractice statute of limitations. See, e.g., All 
v. Intermountain Health Care, Inc., 635 P.2d 30, 31 (Utah 1981) 
(cited in Malan v. Lewis, supra at 670). It is also the standa 
of review used by nearly all other state appellate courts which 
have reviewed the constitutionality of their own respective 
medical malpractice statutes. See American Bank and Trust 
Company v. Community Hospital, 36 Cal. 3d 359, 204 Cal. Rptr. 
671, 683 P.2d 670, 677 n. 10 (1984) (citing 23 states and 3 
federal circuits which have applied the rational basis standard 
of review). The "strict scrutiny" and "means-focus" standards 
review plaintiffs urge the court to adopt in this case are not 
applied to legislation which does not create a "suspect class" 
affect a "fundamental constitutional righto" Malan vc Lewis, 
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supra at 674 n. 17. The United States District Court for the 
District of Utah has already rejected the argument for applying i 
"means-focus" review to a minor's constitutional challenge to the 
Utah medical malpractice statute of limitations: 
Unlike alienage, illegitimacy or gender, the class 
of minors with medical malpractice claims does not 
involve a fundamental interest or a classification 
of a suspect character. . . . 
The correct standard for equal protection 
analysis to be applied in this case under both the 
United States and Utah Constitutions is the 
rational basis test. 
Hargett v. Limberg, 598 F.Supp 152, 157 (D. Utah 1984) (citing 
Schweiker v. Wilson, 450 U.S. 221, 101 S.Ct. 1074, 67 L.Ed.2d 18< 
(1981); Brubaker v. Cavanaugh, 741 F.2d 318 (10th Cir. 1984); 
American Bank and Trust Co. v. Community Hospital, 36 Cal.3d 359 
204 Cal. Rptr. 671, 683 P.2d 670, 677 n. 10 (1984); and Allen v. 
Intermountain Health Care, Inc., 635 P.2d 30, 31 (Utah 1981)). 
Additional support for the principle that minors are 
not a "suspect" class is found in nearly every jurisdiction. 
See, e.g., Halet v. Wend Investment Company, 672 F.2d 1305, 1310 
(9th Cir. 1982) ("children are not an 'insular minority'"); 
Williams v. City of Lewiston, Maine, 642 F.2d 26, 28 (1st Cir. 
JThe "means-focus" or "heightened scrutiny" analysis adopte 
by such cases as Carson v. Maurer, 424 A.2d 825 (N.H. 1980), has 
come under attack by other appellate courts. See e.g., Fitz v. 
Dolyak, 712 F.2d 330, 333 (8th Cir. 1983) ("We are unpersuaded b 
the reasoning of Carson and decline t^o follow it."). 
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1981) ("Minors are not a 'suspect' class"); Rollison v. Biggs, 
567 F.Supp. 964, 972 n.14 (D. Del. 1983) ("courts have applied 
the traditional rational relation test upon finding that 
handicapped children do not constitute a suspect class"). Colii 
K. v. Schmidt, 536 F.Supp. 1375, 1388 (D.R.I. 1982) ("handicappe 
children do not constitute a suspect class"); Hale v. City of 
Santa Paula, 159 Cal. 3d 1233, 206 Cal. Rptr. 265, 270 (1984) 
(rational relationship test is used to determine the validity o 
a statute since minors are not a suspect class); Faucher v. Cit^  
of Auburn, 465 A.2d 1120, 1125 (Me. 1983) (since age is not a 
suspect classification, the legislative scheme should be upheld 
if it bears some rational relationship to the conceivable 
legitimate state interest or purpose). 
2. Access to courts. 
Appellants have additionally challenged the statute o 
limitations under Article I, Section 11 of the Utah 
Constitution« These respondents do not believe, however, that 
the appellants7 open court argument is applicable to the facts < 
this case. 
In essence, appellants7 arguments simply speaks to th 
general question of whether there is denial of access to court 
when there is discovery of an injury after a statute of 
limitations has run, or when a minor does not have a parent or 
guardian willing or able to bring an action on his behalf. 
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Appellant has avoided the application of the cited law to the 
facts in this case. This case is distinguishable from Berry v. 
Beech Aircraft Corp., 717 P.2d 670 (Utah 1985), since in this 
case there was discovery several years before the statute ran anc 
parents willing to assert the minor child's claim. 
Section 78-14-4 is reasonable in its scope and 
effect. Appellant argues, though, th^t it may bar some causes oJ 
action before they accrue. Such a result is extremely unlikely 
since section 78-14-4 expressly excludes from its operation the 
two fact situations most likely to be discovered more than four 
years from the date of the treatment: when a foreign object has 
been wrongfully left within a patient's body, and when the healt] 
care provider fraudulently conceals the alleged misconduct. In 
either case, the cause of action is not barred until after the 
wrongful action has been or should have been discovered. See 
§ 78-14-4(1)(a)-(b). Since most other forms of wrongdoing are 
typically discoverable within four y^ars from the date of 
occurrence, few causes of action are barred before they arise. 
Thus, when a cause of action is barred by the four-year statute 
of repose, it is generally not because the claim has gone 
undiscovered, but because the claimant has simply waited too Ion 
to assert it. The Utah Legislature found it necessary in the 
public interest to bar stale claims So that professional 
liability insurance premiums could be "reasonably and accurately 
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calculated." _Id.. Old claims could be avoided. A specific 
period within which claims could be brought was necessary to 
reduce and stabilize spiraling health care costs and to ensure 
continued quality health care services. 
This same conclusion was reached in Wheaton v. Jack, 
Civil No. C-82-0039 (D. Utah, Aug. 9, 1982) (attached at A-24). 
There, the plaintiff filed her action in 1982, complaining of a 
major surgery performed in 1966. The plaintiff argued that the 
Utah Health Care Malpractice Act unconstitutionally denied her 
the right of access to the courts. The federal court found tha" 
[T]he legislature was responding to a medical 
malpractice crisis that was causing the cost of healt] 
care to increase to the point that it threatened to b< 
available only to the rich. The legislature also foui 
that the quality of that care had diminished because 
health care providers, in response to the numerous 
suits being filed, were practicing defensive medicine 
rather than providing the best care possible. 
Id. at 9-10 (citation omitted); A-32, A-33. Based on those 
findings, the court concluded: 
The overpowering public necessity of making available 
the best health care possible justifies the abolition 
of the right to access to the courts in medical 
malpractice cases four years after the occurrence of 
the act, omission, neglect or occurrence which caused 
the injury. The legislature balanced the conflicting 
Limitation periods that have the effect of eliminating 
stale claims are not improper. See Order of Railroad 
Telegraphers v. Railway Express Agency, Inc., 321 U.S. 342, 349 
(1944); see also Brubaker v. Cavanaugh, 741 F.2d 318, 320-21 
(10th Cir. 1984). 
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intersest and determined that there was no less onerous 
alternative for alleviating the crisis. Therefore, 
§ 78-14-4 does not violate article I, section 11 of the 
Utah Constitution. 
Id. at 10; A-33. 
Appellants have also argued that the status of 
"minority7' deprives minors access to court. It is true that in 
minor injury cases the claim will have to be brought on the 
child's behalf by his parent or guardian. However, it is not 
inequitable or improper to place some responsibility on parents 
or guardians to protect and preserve a minor's claim for an 
injury that accompanies a failure to diagnose or treat. After 
all, parents make daily choices during a child's minority which 
certainly affect the child's future. Parents choose, on the 
minor's behalf, the extent of medical intervention and treatment 
of a child's illnesses. The Utah Legislature recognized this 
responsibility by enacting § 78-14-4. 
The statute of limitations in the Act is not irrationa 
merely because a parent as natural guardian or someone else as 
guardian ad litem may need to pursue the child's cause of action 
on the child's behalf. In many instances parents have the 
primary responsibility to protect, educate and care for their 
children. Some specific duties now placed on the parent for the 
child's protection are set forth in Utah Code Ann. §§ 78-11-6 
(parent or guardian may sue for death or injury of minor caused 
by wrongful act or neglect of another); 78-45-3 (every man shall 
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support his child); 78-45-9 (every man shall support his child) 
78-45-9 (an obligee or state department of social services may 
enforce a child's right of support against parent); 76-7-201 
(failure to provide medical care is criminal neglect; see also 
A.L.R.2d 1047). Compare Wasescha v. Wasescha, 548 P.2d 895 (Ut< 
1976) (children have a right to support); Ottley v. Hill, 21 Ut< 
2d 396, 446 P.2d 301 (1968) (parent under legal duty to pay 
medical care); Gulley v. Gulley, 570 P.2d 127 (Utah 1977) (pare] 
cannot rid himself of duty to support his children by contract) 
Gawand v. Gawand, 615 P.2d 422 (Utah 1980) (parent has duties t< 
support retarded child). See also 34 A.L.R.2d 1460 (right of 
child against parent for support)c5 Further, the Utah Supreme 
Court has long recognized that a statute of limitations may run 
against a minor where rights are vested in a parent or guardian 
Trinnaman v. Clinger, 26 Utah 2d 111, 485 P.2d 1043, 1044 (1971 
Parr v. Zions First National Bank, 13 Utah 2d 404, 375 P.2d 461 
(1962); Dignan v. Nelson, 26 Utah 186, 72 P. 936 (1903). 
DNote also that parents are natural guardians of minor 
children. 39 Am. Jur. 2d, Guardian and Ward § 5, and that a 
guardian has not only a right, but a duty, to institute and 
prosecute litigation necessary to maintain and preserve a ward' 
rights. A guardian may also be liable for a loss caused by the 
guardian's neglect or for breach of duty* Idc at §187. Parent 
are not exempt from this duty. As natural guardians of the 
child, they are the trustees of the child's rights which are 
vested in the parents for the benefit of the child. Id. at 
§ 8
 c They have a duty to protect and preserve the rights and 
welfare of the children, _id. at § 14, and are charged with the 
care and management of the children's estates. JDi. at § 48. 
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B. Application of Standard of Review, 
The statute of limitations of the Utah Health Care 
Malpractice Act, section 78-14-4, must be held to be a 
constitutional exercise of the Utah Legislature's prerogative 
unless appellants can clearly establish that the statute does not 
meet the two-part test of the rational basis standard of 
review. To meet that test the statute must, first, apply equally 
to all members of the created class. Malan v. Lewis, supra. The 
class created and protected by the Acft is health care 
providers. See Allen v. Intermountaift Health Care, Inc., 634 
P.2d 30, 31 (Utah 1981) ("The test . . . is whether there exists 
a rational basis to treat health care providers differently from 
other alleged tort feasors . . . ."). Section 78-14-4 applies 
equally to all health care providers |and therefore complies with 
the first prong of the rational basis test. The statute also 
treats equally the affected group, those persons including minor; 
who have personal injury claims against health care providers. 
Second, to pass equal protection review the different 
treatment afforded the protected cla^s must have a "reasonable 
tendency" to further the legislative objective. Malan v. Lewis, 
693 P.2d 661, 670 (Utah 1984). 
In Allen v. Intermountain Health Care, Inc.. 635 P.2d 
30 (Utah 1981), the Utah Supreme Court reviewed the legislative 
objective behind the Utah Health Care Malpractice Act in upholdi 
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the Act and its statute of limitations against constitutional 
challenges. 
It is therefore seen that the Act was premised 
upon the need to protect and insure the continued 
availability of health care services to the 
public, and not (as asserted by plaintiff) to 
shield insurance companies from legitimate claims. 
The legislature exercised its discretionary prero-
gative in determining that the shortening of the 
statute of limitations (along with requiring 
notice of intention to sue), would insure the 
continued availability of adequate health care 
services. 
635 P.2d at 32;6 see Utah Code Amu § 78-14-2 (1977). 
Appellants' main challenge to the Act is to simply 
question the 1976 Legislature's wisdom in enacting the Utah 
Health Care Malpractice Act. Appellants' argument is inappro-
priate in this forum. Judicial review of legislation does not 
include a re-evaluation of the facts the Legislature could have 
considered to determine the necessity for the enactment. The 
constitutionality of a measure under the equal protection claus 
does not depend on a court's hindsight assessment of the 
empirical success or failure of the measure's provisions. As 
Justice Brennan explained in Minnesota v. Cloverleaf Creamery 
Co., 449 U.S. 456, 466, 101 S. Ct. 715, 66 L.Ed. 2d 659 (1981): 
"whether in fact the Act will promote the [legislative 
6The Allen decision is cited by the court in Malan v. Lewi 
as supporting for the second prong of the equal protection— 
rational basis test. 693 P.2d at 670. 
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objectives] is not the question: the Equal Protection Clause is 
satisfied by our conclusion that the [state] Legislature could 
rationally have decided" that the means chosen will promote the 
legislative objectives. (Emphasis ac^ ded.) Where there was 
evidence before the legislature whicli, if believed to be true, 
supported the creation of the statutory classification, a 
plaintiff cannot invalidate the statute by asking the court to 
accept an argument that the legislature may have been mistaken. 
Id. The prior evidence before the Legislature cannot now be 
received. 
Many of the materials, reports and statistics which 
were presented to the 1976 Utah Legislature prior to the 
enactment of the Utah Health Care Malpractice Act are assuredly 
no longer available. Even the scattered reports available, as 
reported in previous decisions of the Court, however, provide 
ample support for the Legislature's belief that tort reform in 
7One primary reason for not going back into the "evidence" 
on which the Legislature based its judgment is the typical 
unavailability of the data and discussion surrounding a 
particular piece of legislation. The bulk of material that was 
accumulated on the Health Care Malpractice Act was presented and 
discussed in hearings before the Interim Social Services 
Committee. A report of that material was apparently made 
available to the Legislature. Although the hearings were 
recorded, that material is routinely destroyed by the archives 
department after several years. It is therefore impossible for 
any party to present to the court all of the data relied upon by 
the Legislature in making its informed decision. 
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the medical malpractice area was needed to insure the continued 
availability of quality health care, and that the shortening of 
the statute of limitations for medical malpractice claims would 
further that objective. In Allen this Court so concluded. 635 
P.2d 31-32. 
The Legislature's justification for creating a 
shortened statute of limitations for medical malpractice claims 
remains equally valid today. One of the purposes of the statut 
of limitations is to encourage prompt presentation of claims so 
that the alleged tort feasor has a fair opportunity to defend. 
United States v. Kubrick, 444 U.S. Ill, 100 S. Ct. 352, 62 L.Ed 
259 (1979). One court explained the problems with delay: 
When any alleged tort feasor is required to defend 
a claim long after the alleged wrong has occurred, 
the ability to successfully do so is diminished by 
reason of dimmed memories, the death of witnesses, 
and lost documents. As the years between injury 
and suit increases so does the probability that 
the search for truth at trial will be impeded and 
contorted to the benefit of the plaintiff. This 
harm can be exacerbated where the injured party 
continues to grow, develop and change, both 
physically and mentally, after the injury 
complained of has occurred„ 
Johnson v. St. Vincent Hospital, Inc., 273 Ind. 374, 404 N.E.2d 
585, 604 (1980). The Utah Supreme Court has likewise 
acknowledged that protection is needed against the filing of 
tardy claims, and that the medical malpractice statute 
limitations has the salutary effect of "adequately shielding 
health care providers from claims against which it may be 
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difficult to defend because of the lapse of time . . • ." Foil 
v, Ballinger, 601 P.2d 144, 149 (Utah 1979). 
The Legislature properly recognized the need to treat 
medical malpractice claims differently from other general tort 
actions with respect to the operation of the statute of limita-
tions c Tolling a statute of limitations in a medical malpractice 
case would create an insurmountable problem of trying to 
determine the applicable standard of care long after the treat-
ment and injury occur. Advances in knowledge and technology 
occur so rapidly in medicine that state-of-the-art treatment 
today is likely to be considered substandard in the very near 
future. It is unreasonable to assume that a court or jury can 
determine the applicable standard of care with any degree of 
fairness ten or fifteen years after the fact. It would be 
impossible for jurors to fairly assess the physician's actions 
based upon an ancient standard of care without taking into 
account their personal knowledge of advances which have occurred 
during the ensuing decades which make older techniques of 
treatment seem inappropriate. 
These practical problems ot presenting a case more tha 
a decade old are compounded in this case since Jennifer is not 
only a minor but a mental incompetent. Even after Jennifer 
reaches majority she will still be unable and legally incompeten 
to make decisions concerning her own legal rights. She will 
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remain unable to initiate legal proceedings in her own behalf. 
If one accepts appellants' argument that the statute of 
limitations should be tolled until an injured minor is competeni 
to bring an action on his own behalf, the statute of limitations 
for a medical malpractice claim for Jennifer and others similar 
situated may never commence to run, and an action on their beha 
could be instituted decades after the cause of action arises. 
The potential liability of a health care provider and the 
exposure of his liability insurer in that situation becomes 
indefinite; the setting of insurance rates and reserves becomes 
an exercise in futility. It was the spectre of this unjust 
burden which led the Federal District Court for Utah to conclude 
[T]he exclusion of minors and legally incompetent per 
sons from the generally tolling provisions [Utah Code 
Ann, § 78-12-36] is rationally related to the stated 
purpose of containing the malpractice insurance 
crisis. That rationality is particularly evidenced b1 
the facts of the present case. Serious permanent 
injuries to children are often cases of large potenti< 
damages. If the period in which such claims couLd be 
brought were tolled until the young child reached the 
age of majority, a heavy burden would be placed on 
insurance carriers in evaluating and defending agains 
the claim, establishing appropriate reserve require-
ments, and setting rates. The percentage of medical 
malpractice claims brought by minors is far from 
insignificant. Moreover, the uncertainty inherent in 
tolling the period in which such claims may be brough 
could drastically affect insurance rates of at least 
this segment of health care providers that provide 
services exclusively to minors. 
Hargett v. Limberg, 598 F.Supp. at 158. 
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The federal court further stated that the burden of 
weighing the need to contain malpractice insurance costs and 
thereby to ensure the availability of health care services 
against the competing interests of minors and mental incompetent; 
whose parents or guardians fail to timely initiate an action is < 
problem to be handled by the legislature, not the courts. Id. 
The reasons for leaving the balancing process to the legislature 
are important: 
Furthermore any possible harm that may be suffered 
by a minor whose parents ot guardians fail to 
initiate the action aqainst a potential tortious 
wrongdoer within the appropriate time period may 
be outweighed by the chaos, uncertainty, and 
severe prejudice which will occur to those accused 
of tortious conduct, their insurance carriers, and 
ultimately to the insurance carriers7 rate payers 
when lawsuits are permitted to be initiated 
decades after the occurrence of the incident 
giving rise thereto. Before such a sweeping 
change is made the question of "reserve 
requirements" imposed on insurance carriers and 
the resulting effect on insurance rates as well as 
many other issues must be addressed. The 
Legislature, not the courts, is the proper forum 
for the resolution of such issues. 
De Santis v. Yaw, 290 Pa. Super. 535, 434 A.2d 1273, 1279 (1981) 
Based upon the authorities cited above, appropriate 
principles of judicial review, and the legislative objectives 
behind the enactment of the Act and its statute of limitations, 
it is clear that § 78-14-4 complies with state as well as federc 
guarantees of equal protection of laws and does not deny these 
appellants access to the courts. Ot^ ier jurisdictions which hav< 
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analyzed equal protection and due process attacks by minor 
plaintiffs against medical malpractice statutes of limitations 
have reached similar results. See, e.g., Donabedian v. Manzer, 
153 Cal. 3d 592, 200 Cal. Rptr. 597 (1984); Kite v. Campbell, 14 
Cal. 3d 793, 191 Cal. Rptr. 363 (1983) (statute providing that 
medical malpractice actions by a minor must be commenced within 
three years from the date of the alleged wrongful act did not 
deny a minor's right to due process under law? as a matter of 
constitutional law, a statute of limitation is remedial in natur 
and does not destroy fundamental rights); Wheeler v. Lenski, 8 
Kan. App. 2d 408, 658 P.2d 1056 (1983) (statute which shortens 
period of limitation for minors and incapacitated persons in 
medical malpractice actions did not violate equal protection or 
due process); Petri v. Smith, 307 Pa. Super 261, 453 A.2d 342 
(1982) (the settled rule is that it is not violative of any 
constitutional rights to hold minors bound equally with adults t 
the prescribed statutory periods within which legal causes of 
action may be brought); Reese v. Rankin Fite Memorial Hospital, 
403 So.2d 158 (Ala. 1981) (statute of limitations did not violat 
due process and equal protection provisions of state or federal 
constitutions on ground that statute treated minors injured 
through medical malpractice differently from minor victims of 
other torts); Thomas v. Niemann, 397 So.2d 90 (Ala. 1981) 
(minor's medical malpractice action was barred by the statute of 
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limitations and was properly dismissed); Johnson v. St. Vincent 
Hospital, Inc., 273 Ind. 374, 404 N.E|.2d 585 (1980) (time 
limitation affecting medical malpractice claim for death of a 
minor child was not contrary to due process and equal protec-
tion) ; Rohrabaugh v. Wagoner, 274 Ind, 661, 413 N.E.2d 891 (1980] 
(court held that the legislature was not constitutionally 
mandated to suspend application of statutes of limitation in 
cases of infancy or incapacity and dismissed appeal which 
challenged constitutionality of statiite of limitations of medica 
malpractice act). 
CONCLUSION 
In light of the above, the$e respondents respectfully 
request the Court to affirm the lower court's determination that 
the appellants' discovery of the complained of injury occurred a 
least prior to November 1977 and triggered the statute of 
limitations, which now bars their complaint. Further, the Court 
should find that the action of the Utah Legislature in enacting 
the Utah Health Care Malpractice Act and its statute of 
limitations is an appropriate response to a legitimate and real 
concern. It is, after all, the public which ultimately pays the 
cost of professional liability insurance and benefits from the 
continued availability of such coverage when injuries are suf-
fered. In the furtherance of that qbjective, the Legislature 
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reasonably required all persons, including minors, to present 
claims timely, which is essential to give health care providers 
and their insurers a reasonable opportunity to anticipate and 
plan for losses in an extremely volatile insurance market. The 
Legislature also perceived that in medicine, where advances in 
procedures, knowledge and technology occur so rapidly, a long 
delay in the prosecution of an action seriously and detrimental! 
affects a health care provider's ability to defend care that may 
have been standard when rendered, but which may seem ineffectual 
or even harmful in retrospect. 
Respondents respectfully urge the Court to affirm the 
lower court's decision. 
DATED this 3-S^W of September, 1986. 
KIRTON, McCONKIE & BUSHNELL 
By foil tl/ l>'j {iCU-ifW 
Be Lloyd Poelman 
David B. Erickson 
Attorneys for Respondents 
Veasy, Bowman and 
Hospital Entities 
330 South Third East 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Telephone: (801) 521-3680 
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PROOF OF SERVICE 
The undersigned, attorney for respondents Veasy, Bowma 
and Hospital Entities, hereby certifies that on September 25, 19 
he caused to be served the foregoing Respondents7 Brief on all 
parties to this appeal by mailing four (4) copies thereof by 
first-class mail, postage prepaid, addressed to their attorneys 
follows: 
Kathryn Collard, Esq. 
401 Boston Building 
Salt Lake City, Utah 841H 
P. Richard Meyer, Esq. 
Robert N. Williams, Esq. 
P. O. Box 2608 
Jackson, Wyoming 83001 
Gary B. Ferguson, Esq. 
Gary D. Stott, Esq. 
RICHARDS, BRANDT, MILLER & NELSON 
P. 0. Box 2465 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84110 
IT Lloyd Poelman 
David B. Erickson 
Attorneys for Respondents 
Veasy, Bowman and 
Hospital Entities 
330 South Third East 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
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IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
JENNIFER CHAPMAN, by and through 
her guardian, TERESA CHAPMAN, 
ROBERT CHAPMAN AND TERESA 
CHAPMAN, individually, 
Plaintiffs, 
vs. 
PRIMARY CHILDREN'S HOSPITAL, a 
hospital organized to do business 
in the State of Utah; PRIMARY 
CHILDREN'S MEDICAL CENTER, a 
hospital organized to do business 
in the State of Utah; INTERMOUNTAIN 
HEALTH CARE, a Utah corporation dba 
PRIMARY CHILDREN'S HOSPITAL; IHC 
HOSPITALS, INC., a Utah corporation 
dba PRIMARY CHILDREN'S HOSPITAL; 
THE HEALTH SERVICES CORPORATION 
OF THE CHURCH OF JESUS CHRIST OF 
LATTER-DAY SAINTS, a former or 
present Utah corporation dba 
PRIMARY CHILDREN'S HOSPITAL; GARTH 
MEYERS, M.D.; L. GEORGE VEASY, M.D., 
KAREN BOWMAN, R.N.; SCOTT WETZEL 
COMPANY a Utah corporation; THE 
HOME GROUP, INC., a foreign 
corporation; JOHN DOE I-X; and 
BLACK CORPORATIONS I-V, 
AFFIDAVIT OF 
L. GEORGE VEASY, M.D. 
Civil No. C85-6782 
(HON. HOMER F. WILKINSON) 
Defendants. 
STATE OF UTAH ) 
ss. 
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE ) 
The undersigned L. George Veasy, being first duly sworn 
under oath deposes and says: 
1. I am a defendant in the above-entitled matter. I 
am a licensed physician and surgeon under the laws of the State 
of Utah. 
2. In February 1973, on referral from another doctor, 
I was the admitting physician in connection with the hospitaliza-
tion of Jennifer Chapman at Primary Children's Medical Center, 
although I did not perform the two heart surgeries she underwent 
during that admission. Approximately six hours following her 
second surgery Jennifer Chapman experienced a generalized seizure 
(convulsion) following which her heart stopped (cardiac 
arrest). This episode left Jennifer Chapman immediately and 
severely handicapped with both physical and mental impairments 
for which she has been under continuous medical supervision and 
care to this date. 
3. In the months and years immediately following the 
episode in February 1973 that left her impaired, I have had many 
discussions and considerable correspondence with Teresa Chapman 
and Robert Chapman, parents of Jennifer Chapman. On several 
occasions they have alleged that medical negligence during her 
hospitalization at Primary Children's Medical Center in February 
1973 caused Jennifer's impaired condition. 
Irton, McConki* 
& Bushneil 
'rotessional Corporation | 
330 S 300 EAST 
SALT LAKE CITY 
UTAH 84111 
- 2 -
(A-2) 
4* As an example and as evidence of such allegations 
made by the Chapmans, I attach hereto as Exhibit "A" a copy of an 
undated, hand-written letter from Robert Chapman to me which I 
received sometime prior to May 2, 1977o [For convenience, a 
typed copy of said letter, without spelling or gramatical 
corrections, is also attached,] 
5. Frequently since 1973 I have participated in 
providing or coordinating medical care for Jennifer Chapman at 
the request of her parents Robert Chapman and Teresa Chapman. 
Based on my personal conversations and correspondence with Teresa 
and Robert Chapman, I know and state th$t continuously since 1973 
they have believed, albeit erroneously, that the episode which 
Jennifer Chapman experienced at Primary Children's Medical Center 
in February 1973 was preventable and re$ulted from medical 
negligence by those who attended her. 
6. I am informed and believe that plaintiffs have 
consulted with various attorneys concerning what they believed to 
be a claim for medical negligence against one or more of the 
defendants named above including, but probably not limited to, 
the following attorneys: 
Clrton, McConki* 
& Buthn«ll 
Protewonai Corporation ] 
330 S 300 EAST 
SALT LAKE CITY 
UTAH 84111 
Richard D. Burbidge, Esq. 
22 East 100 South 
Salt Lake City, Utah 
Stephen G. Crockett, Esq. 
Salt Lake City, Utah 
[an additional Salt Lake City 
attorney whose name is not 
presently recalled] 
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November 1977 
January 1979 
1979 or 1980 
(A-3) 
Kirton, McConkte 
& ButhneH 
V Professional Corporation | 
330 S 300 EAST 
SALT LAKE CITY 
UTAH 84111 
July 1985 
November 1985 
Jack C. Helgesen, Esq. October 1984 
HELGESEN & WATERFALL, P.'C. 
2650 Washington Boulevard 
Ogden, Utah 84401 
Fred R. Silvester, Esq. 
BLACK & MOORE 
261 East Broaday 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Kathryn Collard 
Attorney at Law 
401 Boston Building 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Plus co-counsel from Wyoming November 1985 
7. I do not believe there are any significant matters 
learned by plaintiffs in July 1984 concerning the allegations in 
the complaint herein that were not known to plaintiffs in 1977 or 
which were not then readily discoverable by them through acting 
with reasonable diligence on their strongly held belief that 
Jennifer was injured by medical negligence in 1973. 
8. I declare the foregoing matters to be true of my 
own knowledge except as to matters set forth upon information and 
belief, and as to such matters I believe them to be true. 
L.VGeorge V^6y, M.D. 
SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN to before me this 7 ^ day of 
December, 1985. 
My Commission Expires: 
Notary Public 
Residing at Salt Lake City, Utah 
//3S2#£. 
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irton, McConkto 
& Bushneil 
3rofesstonal Corporation 
330 S 300 EAST 
SALT LAKE CITY 
UTAH 84111 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
This is to certify that I served a true and correct 
copy of the foregoing AFFIDAVIT OF L. GEfORGE VEASY, M.D., by 
depositing the same in the United States mail, postage prepaid, 
on this the f7~~ day of December, 1985 to the following: 
Kathryn Collard, Esq. 
401 Boston Building 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
P. Richard Meyer, Esq. 
Robert N. Williams, Esq. 
Pe 0. Box 2608 
Jackson, Wyoming 83001 
Gary B. Ferguson, Esq. 
RICHARDS, BRANDT, MILLER & NELSON 
P. 0. Box 2465 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84110 
^S^^^^n^Ti ^^^rJ^Au)^. 
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[Typed copy of Exhibit "A"] 
Dr. George Veasy 
Primary Childrens Hospital 
Salt Lake City, Utah 
Dear Dr. Veasy: 
Some time ago I sat in your office and asked that you advise 
me and help me to make a decission concerning a malpractice suite 
in Jennifers behalf. Since that meeting I have given daily 
thought and prayer as to which dirrection I should go in 
providing Jennifer with security for the time she will be here on 
earth. I am writing this letter so that ypu will have a better 
understanding of our situation and why I aim making the decision 
that I am. 
First of all in our meeting you seemed more concerned about 
what our atorney would bennifit from the case rather than what 
Jennifer could obtain. We sat and talked for probably an hour 
and a half and never once did you ask how Jennifer was doing. 
You refered only to those damn lawers and the blood money that I 
was seeking. I have pondered this in my hart daily sience that 
meeting. I was raised in a religious home and taught honesty and 
respect for working to obtain what we have. Our profit has 
warned us against accepting filthy lucre and that money in of 
itself is not evil but the honesty and (undecipherable) in which 
we obtain it is the important fact. 
I would at this time like to assure you that obtaining 
filthy lucre or blood money as you have called it is not my 
intention. I am not seeking to destroy any doctors or put a 
hospital out of business. Insurance premiums our paid to protect 
us all against hardship in this world. I Ihave to insure my 
business against fire, theft, and accident to protect me as a 
business man. It is not something that only doctors pay. 
What has brought me to the decision to go ahead with the 
suite are two events that have happened in our lives and I would 
like to explain them to you so you can understand our feelings. 
First of all in our home we have living with us an uncle who 
is mentally handicaped. We live with him to take care of his 
needs and try to bring him some sort of happiness in this life. 
We have now found it necessary to move after five years of caring 
for this man. We find that the cost of housing is increasing so 
(A 
rapidly and our family is growing to quickly that we have no 
alternative but to get into our own home. In the nearly five 
years we have been here not one relative has offered to help us 
with this burden. We have become the center of jealousy and back 
biting among religious people. Now that we are building our own 
home it seems that no one wants the responsibility of caring for 
Uncle Lynn. The fighting and accusing is already taking place. 
It looks as though I might have to build an extra room in our 
basement to let him live in because no one wants him. I can not 
in good conciance after what has happened here in the last five 
years leave Jennifer as a burden to someones family if something 
should happen to Teresa or I before she is gone. The burdens and 
responsibilities have been tremendous. 
On Feb. 24th of this year my wife and our five children were 
driving to pick me up from work when an International Scout went 
out of control and ran into the back of our car. At this point 
there were some minor injuries but everyone seemed to be okay. 
Because of the impact the doors were jamed and they could not get 
out of the car. While they were waiting for help a semi truck 
and trailer went out of control and hit them again knocking them 
a hundred and fifty feet down the highway and completely 
demolishing our vehicle. When the police arrived they found my 
wife unconcious in the back seat of the car and my eight year old 
boy administering first aid to Jennifer and our baby Cory. The 
entire family had to be taken to the hospital and treated. 
Teresa, Jennifer and Cory were admitted because of their 
injuries. They were there for a period of five days before being 
released. While they were there the nurses found it so difficult 
to care for Jennifer that in five days they fed her exactly 1/2 
of one meal. That 1/2 of a meal took a nurse over 1-1/2 hours to 
get down her. The rest of the meals were fed to her buy me. I 
had to close up my business to care for her. I takes a 
tremendous amount of paciance to care for her and I can't leave 
her to die in the hands of people who don't care for her and love 
her the way we do. Because of the accident I realize how close I 
came to losing my wife and children. Had Teresa been killed 
Jennifer would have been left in this world without the ability 
to care for herself and it would be just a matter of time before 
she would be back to the stage we brought her home from the 
hospital in four years ago as doctor Myer put it, a vegetable. 
Now I am well aware that I am not qualified medically or 
legally to answer all the questions pertaining to a malpractice 
suite. The way I understand the law the burden of proof is on me 
to prove both negligence and physical damage. The negligence is 
obvious but to what extent the physical damage can be linked to 
this negligence only a man of your medical knowledge can know for 
-2-
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sure. I do know that besides being mentally and physically 
handicaped Jennifer also has an enlarged heart making it 
impossible for her to ever lead any kind of normal active life 
and eventually will be the cause of her death. She was hurt and 
hurt bad because of wrong decisions made in her early life. The 
laws in the state of Utah allow for compensation for pain and 
suffering* She suffered and felt pain for the first five months 
of her life only to be turned away by doctors that didn't have 
time for little girls that could hold their breath. She felt 
death in her soul at least twice a month and fought for her very 
life only to have it completely destroyed. You told me if she 
had died you would have been obligated to testify in her 
behalf. A dead person feels no pain and suffering. She is 
entitled to security for as long as she is willing to go on 
struggling for her life. This case has to be weighed upon its 
individual merits and not by what it costs for insurance for each 
bed in a hopsital. I reemphasize that I am not seeking to 
destroy anyone or collect a fortune in blood money. The help 
provided by the state and federal governments to the handicapped 
are a mockery to the society we live in. They only provide 
administrative moneys and do nothing for the individual 
patient. I can no longer depend on other people to care for my 
daughter. She is only loved in our home and the financial burden 
is to great for me to bare alone. I don't know what Jennifers 
future will bring but as her father I beg you to consider 
Jennifer as an individual and not an insurance burden to each bed 
in each hospital. Before too long my atorney will be in contact 
with you and I ask that you realize that he represents Jennifers 
interests and set aside your feeling toward the legal 
profession. It is imparative that we have honest factual 
answers. 
I do hope that we can continue through life as the best of 
friends and that I can alway intrust Jennifers life in your very 
capable hands. 
Sincerely, 
Robert Chapman 
P.S. Thanks for your time. 
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rotesstonai Corporation j 
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IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
JENNIFER CHAPMAN, by and through 
her guardian, TERESA CHAPMAN, 
ROBERT CHAPMAN AND TERESA 
CHAPMAN, individually, 
Plaintiffs, 
vs. 
PRIMARY CHILDREN'S HOSPITAL, a 
hospital organized to do business 
in the State of Utah, et al. 
Defendants. 
AFFIDAVIT OF 
SCOTT OLSEN 
Civil No. C85-6782 
(HON. HOMER P. WILKINSON) 
STATE OF UTAH ) 
: ss. 
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE ) 
The undersigned Scott Olsen, being first duly sworn on 
oath deposes and says: 
1. I am the manager of Scott Wetzel Services, Inc., an 
insurance adjustment agency in Salt Lake City, Utah, which for 
many years has represented Primary Children's Medical Center and 
its predecessors in matters of legal liability claimed against 
the hospital and its agents. I have been employed by Scott 
<A-14) 
Wetzel Services, Inc. since 1976 and I am familiar with this 
agency's records relating to claims by Jennifer Chapman and her 
parents against Primary Children's Medical Center and others 
relating to surgery performed on Jennifer Chapman in February 
1973. 
2. On May 27, 1983 I met personally with Robert and 
Teresa Chapman, with Jennifer also present. At that time the 
Chapmans alleged that Jennifer had been injured in February 197 3 
in connection with problems that developed following a second 
cardiac operation, because there had not been a prompt response 
to Jennifer's cardiac arrest. On June 17, 1983 I wrote a letter 
to Robert Chapman, a copy of which is attached hereto as Exhibit 
"A". 
3. On July 13, 1983 Robert Chapman telephoned me, 
again alleging that injury to his daughter Jennifer in connection 
with heart surgery at Primary Children's Medical Center in 
February 1973 was the result of negligence by Dr. Veasy, Dr. 
Meyers, Primary Children's Medical Center and/or some of its 
employees. He demanded $350,000 in compensation. I again 
advised him that we had set up a file on this matter in 1978 when 
Dr. Veasy had met with the Chapmans and their attorney, Stephen 
Crockett, concerning their claims against Primary Children's 
Medical Center and others; that we had reviewed their claims at 
that time, concluding there was no negligence or liability; and 
Klrton, McConki* 
& BufthneK 
A Professional Corporation j 
330 S 300 EAST 
SALT LAKE CITY 
UTAH 84111 
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that again more recently we had reviewed the matter and 
reaffirmed our original conclusions. Mr. Chapman became very 
abusive to me over the telephone. 
4. On July 23, 1985 I sent a letter to Black & Moore, 
attorneys for the Chapmans, a copy of which is attached hereto as 
Exhibit "B". Before sending that letter I again carefully 
reviewed the files of our offices. The statements in Exhibit "B" 
accurately reflect the results of that review of our file on this 
claim. 
5. I have read the foregoing and declare the content 
thereof to be true of my own knowledge, except as to matters set 
forth upon information and belief, and as to such matters I 
believe them to be true. 
^ — 
Scott Olsen 
SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN to before me this 
February, 1986. 
day of 
My Commission Expires; Residing at Salt Lake City, Utah 
rton, McConki* 
& Bushnell 
rofessonai Corporation | 
)30 S 300 EAST 
SALT LAKE CITY 
UTAH 84111 
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4 
S c o t t W e t z e l S e r v i c e s I n c o r p o r a t e d 
An Affiliate of The Home Group. Inc 
833 East 400 South, Suite 104 • Saft Lake City, Utah 84102 
Phone (801) 322-2541 
June 17, 1983 
Robert Chapman 
4597 South 1100 Vfest 
Riverdale, Utah 84403 
RE: Insured: Prinary Childrenfs Medical Center 
Claiirant: Jennifer Chapman (minor) 
D/Loss: 2-28-73 
Our File: 112-47-73 
Dear Mr. Chapman: 
I enjoyed the visit we had on May 27, 1983 with you and your wife and Jennifer, 
I was able to go back in our files and find that a claim had been set up concern-
ing your child back in 1977. Vfe at that time, checked with the doctors involved 
in the treatment of Jennifer and they all agreed that the problem that she 
experienced was caused by an emboli reaching your child's brain which caused the 
seizure and that led to the cardiac arrest. They have not changed their opinion 
at this time, so as you can see, I have to rely on the doctor's diagnosis of 
your child's problem. 
As to the other things we spoke of during the meeting, I feel that it will be 
necessary for you to follcw-up with therapy and any other treatment that your 
child does now or should receive. 
I don't knew what else I can do at the present time to help you, but I will be 
more than happy to listen to whatever suggestions you may have. Please feel free 
to call at any time at the above number. 
Very truly yours, 
Scott Olsen 
SO/11 
c/c Charles Doane, Primary Children's Medical Center 
EXHIBIT "A" 
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S c o t t W e t z e l S e r v i c e s I n t o r p o r a t e d 
An Affiliate of The Home Group. Ine 
633 East 400 South, Suite 104 • Salt Lake City. Utah 84102 
Phone (801) 322-2541 
July 23, 1^85 
Black & Moore 
Attorneys at Law 
Suite 300, 261 East Broadway 
Salt Lake City, UT 84111 
Attention: Fred Re Silvester, Esq. 
Res Insured: Primary Children fs Medical Center 
Your Cient: Jennifer Chapman (minor) 
D/Incident: 2/28/73 
Our File: 112-47-73 
Dear Mr. Silvester: 
We received your Notice of Intent dated Ju^ie 13, 1985. It contains 
errors which I think should be straightened out. The child's birth, 
to the best of my knowledge, was August 10, 1972. This was not 
when the incident occurred. The incident you are speaking of in 
your Notice of Intent occurred on February 28, 1973. 
Also, it may be to your benefit to know th^t a claim was presented 
by your clients, Mr. and Mrs. Chapman, in September of 1977 which 
was investigated by this office and denied in 1978. Again, in 1983, 
another claim was presented by your clients which was denied on July 
13, 1983. In both these claims, they alleged the same malpractice 
that you speak of in your letter, that is, that the child suffered 
brain damage by a hypoxic insult that was due to the failure of 
Nurse Bowman to recognize the alleged cardiac arrest of your client. 
Your clients have written a number of letters indicating the same 
allegation to the hospitals over a period of time. As a matter of 
fact, they hired an attorney in 1978 to pursue the claims they felt 
they had against McKay-Dee Hospital and against Primary Children's 
Medical Center. Their attorney evidently advised them they had no 
claim and refused to pursue it. 
EXHIBIT "B" 
Fred R. Silvesterf Esq. July 23, 1985 
Page 2 
Also, in reviewing the chart once again9 there is ample indication 
that the child was seizuring some time before the arrest, which 
would indicate that there was an insult to the brain probably in 
the form of an emboli that indeed caused the tragic situation that 
your client now finds herself in. 
We will again deny this claim in its entirety and defend any action 
against Primary Children's Hospital to the fullest. It may be well 
for you to have the chart and information that you can acquire re-
viewed by an expert before you proceed with a law suit. 
Very truly yours, 
Scott Olsen 
Manager 
SO/jh 
cc: Scott Kelly, IHC 
Charles Doane, Primary Children's Medical Center 
(A-19) 
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B. Lloyd Poelman - A2617 
David B. Erickson - A3788 
KIRTON, McCONKIE & BUSHNELL 
Attorneys for Defendant 
330 South Third East 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Telephone: (801) 521-3680 
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IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
JENNIFER CHAPMAN, by and through 
her guardian, TERESA CHAPMAN, 
ROBERT CHAPMAN AND TERESA 
CHAPMAN, individually, 
Plaintiffs, 
vs. 
PRIMARY CHILDREN'S HOSPITAL, a 
hospital organized to do business 
in the State of Utah, et al. 
Defendants. 
SUPPLEMENTAL AFFIDAVIT 
OF L. GEORGE VEASY, M.D, 
Civil No. C85-6782 
(HOfcl. HOMER P. WILKINSON) 
STATE OF UTAH ) 
ss. 
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE ) 
The undersigned, L. George Veasy, being first duly 
sworn under oath deposes and says: 
1. I am a defendant in the above-entitled matter. 
This affidavit supplements my previous affidavit dated 
December 7, 1985 filed herein. 
2. On September 9, 1977 I had a conference with Mr. 
and Mrs. Robert Chapman, the parents of Jennifer Chapman in which 
(A-
they stated their belief that there was negligence in the 
intensive care unit of Primary Children's Medical Center shortly 
after Jennifer returned from her second surgery on February 28, 
1973. Mrs. Chapman said that Jennifer had been seizuring for 
five minutes before that fact was recognized by the nurses. 
3. On September 13, 1977 I sent a letter to Don 
Poulter, Administrator of Primary Children's Medical Center, a 
copy of which is attached hereto as Exhibit "B". The content 
thereof is true according to my best knowledge, belief and 
information. 
4. In February 1978 I met with Robert and Teresa 
Chapman along with their attorney Stephen Crockett. The subject 
of that conversation was whether the Chapmans had grounds for 
legal action (a) against McKay-Dee Hospital and Drs. Richard 
Nilsson and Arthur M. Davenport for their treatment of Jennifer 
prior to February 28, 1973, or (b) against Primary Children's 
Medical Center and members of its medical and nursing staffs, 
relating to resuscitation of Jennifer following her second 
surgery on February 28, 1973. In that discussion Teresa Chapman 
and Robert Chapman again said they believed there had been 
negligence in failure by a nurse to make timely detection of 
Jennifer's cardiac arrest and provide prompt resuscitation 
efforts. 
ton, McConkl© 
& Bushnell 
Sessional Corporation | 
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5. I have read the foregoing and declare the content 
thereof to be true of my own knowledge except as to matters set 
forth on information and belief, and as to such matters I believe 
them to be true. 
X 
SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN to before flie this y 5 ^ day of 
February, 1986. 
<r-^^S-r?r? JEti \-7J?<2s2o>>^ 
My Commission Expires: 
Notary Publ c 
Residing at Salt Lake City, Utah 
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J t " W ' »." »vi«»VJ'V.»»W 
320 Twelfth Ave Sol? take Ofv Utah 84103 801 32* <*)6i f i t 315 316 
September 13, 1977 
Don Poulter, Adminstrator 
Pr imary Children's Medical Center 
Dear Don, 
On Fr iday, September 9th, I had a conference with M r , and M r s . 
Robert Chapman, the parents of Jennifer Chapman. I have talked with 
you previously about the likelihood that these people might be initiating 
a suit which most likely wil l be at D r . Richard Nilsson and D r . Davenport 
in Ogden. I am not certain whether or not they want to initiate a suit 
against us. 
They do believe there was negligence in the Intensive Care Unit 
right after she returned from her second surgery. M r s . Chapman maintains 
that the patient had been seizuring for five minutes and that this was not 
recognized by the nurses. This is at variance with the nursing story and 
certainly with the records. I f indeed she had been seizuring a long time 
before her actual cardiac arrest occurred, this would tend to implicate a 
cerebrovascular insult before her cardiac arrest . This little g i r l , as you 
know, remains a very hopeless neurologic cripple. The parents are con-
cerned about the continued expense they have in the care of this young lady 
plus the fact that should anything happen to the mother, which nearly did 
occur when she was in an automobile accident, there would be no one to care 
for Jennifer. 
I don't know just exactly what action the Chapman's intend to take, 
but I think we should notify our legal council. I , l ikewise, would like to 
turn over to them my personal records on Jennifer and would like an opinion 
as to whether or not this should be turned over to them. I don't believe 
there is anything in the record that they would not be welcome to see. 
Actually, we don't have anything to hide. This has been a real tragedy for 
this beautiful little gir l and I am sympathetic and can understand the parents 
feelings in this regard. 
Sincerely yours, 
^Ac^t if*-* 
L. GEORGE V E A S Y , M . D . 
L G V / d m 
EXHIBIT "B" 
ff1LED 
O l S l W ^ OF UTAH 
RUG 9 I ssPHTC 
PAUL I. EAOCER 
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE D3®&fCT OF UTAH 
CENTRAL DIVISION 
MAX2NE WHEATON, 
Plaintiff, 
-vs-_ 
JOSEPH E. JACK, M.D., 
Defendant. 
MEMORANDUM DECISION 
AND ORDER 
Civil Nos C-82-0039 
This matter is before the court on plaintiff's motion to 
strike defendant's defense that this action is barred by the 
applicable statute of limitations. | This motion was argued 
June 7, 1982. W. Brent Wilcox represented the plaintiff and 
Francis J. Carney represented the defendant. Following the 
hearing, the court took the matter under advisement and has 
since reviewed the memoranda of counsel* the authorities 
cited therein and other relevant material6 Based upon the 
foregoing, the court renders the following decision. 
On or about March 7, 1966 defendant performed major 
surgery on plaintiff in order to relieve plaintiff's upper 
abdominal pain with radiation of the back and substernal 
distress in the form of heartburn and acid indigestion. 
Plaintiff alleges that the surgery was unnecessarily and 
negligently performed and that this was fraudulently concealed 
from plaintiff. Plaintiff apparently became aware of this 
sometime during July of 1981. According to Utah's statute of 
limitation for malpractice actions against health care 
providers, a case of this nature, absent the claim of fraudu-
lent concealment, must be "commence^ within two years after 
the plaintiff or patient discovers, lor through the use of 
reasonable diligence should have discovered the injury, 
whichever first occurs, but not to exceed four years after 
the date of the alleged act, omission, neglect or 
(A 
occurrence . . • ." Utah Code Ann, § 78-14-4(1) (hereinafter 
referred to as "§ 78-14-4") .- Therefore, absent the concealment 
claim, the latest this case could have been commenced was 
March 1970. If this were a case where the surgeon wrongfully 
left a foreign object in the patient's body, the limitation 
period would not foreclose the action until "one year after 
the plaintiff or patient discovered], or through the use of 
reasonable diligence should have discovered, the existence 
of the foreign object . . . ." Utah Code Ann. § 78-14-4(1) (a). 
Plaintiff argues that these two provisions arbitrarily and 
unreasonably discriminate between those who are injured by 
foreign objects left in the patient's body by health care 
providers and those who suffer other injuries at the hands 
of health care providers. The claim is that this violates 
the equal protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment of the 
United States Constitution and sections 2 and 24 of article 
2/ 
I of the Utah Constitution.-' Plaintiff also argues that, 
although wrongful death is not an element of this case, 5 78-14-4 
is unconstitutional because it, in violation of equal protection, 
discriminates between claimants for wrongful death caused by 
health care providers'and claimants for wrongful death 
- Although referred to as a statute of limitation, S 78-
14-4 is both a statute of limitation and a statute of repose. 
The two year period is a statute of limitation in that it 
procedurally limits the time in which a suit may be filed 
but does not determine the substantive right to bring the 
suit in the first place. The four year period is a statute 
of repose in that it cuts off any 'right of action after 
passage of a certain period of time. This in essence is a 
substantive determination of a right to bring an action. 
Turner, The Counter-Attack to Retake the Citadel Continues: 
An Analysis of the Constitutionality of Statutes of Repose 
in Products Liability, 46 J. Air L. & Com. 449, 476 (1981). 
- Sections 2 and 24 of art. I of the Utah Constitution 
are essentially equal protection provisions which read as 
follows: 
"All political power is inherent in the people; 
and all free governments are founded on their 
authority for equal protection and benefit, and they have tl" 
right to alter or reform their government as the public 
welfare may require." Utah Const, art. I § 2. 
"All laws of a general nature shall have uniform 
operation." Utah Const, art. I S 24. 
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caused by other tortfeasors. Under the repose provision of 
S 78-14-4, see, n. 1 supra, health care providers liable in 
wrongful death actions cannot be sued more than four years 
after the death regardless of whether the fact of death or 
its cause.has been ascertained• Any other tortfeasor, 
according to plaintiff, and in reliance on Myers v. McDonald, 
635 P.2d 84 (Utah 1981), remains liable for wrongful death 
until two years after the discovery of the fact and circum-
stances of the death. Plaintiff's final argument is that 
the four year repose provision of S 78-14-4 denies her the 
right of access to the courts in violation of equal protection 
and Utah Const, art. I S 11 which provides that "[a]11 
courts shall be open and every person, for any injury done 
to him . . . shall have remedy by due course of law, which 
shall be administered without denial. . . . " 
The correct standard for equal protection analysis to 
be applied to the facts of this ca$e under both the United 
States and Utah Constitutions is t^ ie minimal scrutiny or 
rational basis test. McGowan v. Maryland, 366 UcS. 420 
(1961); Leetham v. McGinn, 524 P.2d 323, 325 (Utah 1974); 
Hansen v. Public Employees Retirement System, 122 Utah 44, 
246 P.2d 591 (1952). Under this test the courts 
ask only whether it is conceivable 
that the classification bears a 
rational relationship to an end of 
government which is not prohibited 
by the Constitution. So long as 
it is arguable that the
 fOther branch 
of government had such a basis for 
creating the classification the Court 
will not invalidate the law. 
J. Nowak, R. Rotunda, J. Young, Constitutional Law 524 (1978). 
In Foil v^ Ballinger, 601 P.2d 144 (Utah 1979), the Utah 
Supreme Court in discussing what S 78-14-4(1) meant by "discovery 
of the injury" commented that w[w]e see no basis for making a 
legal distinction between having no knowledge of an injury 
. . . and no knowledge that a knowri injury was caused by 
unknown negligence." Id. at 148. Arguably, the statute 
makes such a distinction when liability for a "'"r-tign 
(A-26) 
objects" injury exists until one year after the date of 
discovery while liability for any other type of medical 
malpractice injury whose cause is undiscovered is absolutely 
cut off after four years. It must be remembered that Foil 
dealt with the running of the two year period of S 78-14-4 
and not the absolute four year bar provided in the same 
section. The Foil court was not called upon to determine 
whether there is a rational basis for making such a distinction 
under the four year rule. However, the court acknowledged 
the four year maximum period and implied that such a provision 
was necessary to protect health care providers "from claims 
against which it may be difficult to defend because of the 
lapse of time," particularly in light of the more liberal 
discovery rule adopted in that case. I<3. at 149. 
Plaintiff further questions the propriety of tolling 
the time in which a person injured by "foreign object" 
malpractice can initiate a suit until the injury is discovered 
but not doing so for those who suffer a different type of 
injury. Both questions are subsets of a larger issue: is 
there a rational basis for distinguishing between those 
injured by "foreign object" medical malpractice and those 
injured by another form of medical malpractice. 
In
 Allrid v. Emory University, 285 S.E.2d 521 (Ga. 
1982), the court was faced with a similar statute and the 
same question. The court found the statute to be constitutional 
as bearing a fair and substantial relation to a legitimate 
legislative objective. 
The purpose of the legislature in making a 
distinction between the two types of medical 
malpractice was to allow the plaintiff's 
claim which does not rest on professional 
diagnostic judgment or discretion to survive 
until actual discovery of the wrongdoing. In 
such situations, the danger of belated, 
false or frivolous claims is eliminated. 
The foreign object in the patient's body 
is directly traceable to the doctor's 
malfeasance. 
Id. at 524; see, Comment, An Analysis of State Legislative 
'Responses to the Medical Malpractice Crisis, 1975 Duke L.J. 
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1417, 1435-1436 (1975). The very nature of the two injuries 
provides a rational basis for treating them differently. By 
drawing such a distinction, the Utah legislature limited the 
potential for frivolous and undeserving claims to be asserted 
thereby reducing the ultimate cost of health care via medical 
malpractice insurance premiums and hopefully improving 
patient care by reducing a health bare providers fear that 
the patient is a potential adversary, Utah Code Ann. $ 78-14-2, 
This is accomplished while preserving those claims which are 
obviously legitimate. This statute was enacted in an effort 
to combat the crisis of ever increasing medical costs which 
has existed in this country and this state for several 
years. This is a legigimate state interest which the statute 
is designed to achieve.. The distinction drawn by Utah Code 
Ann. S 78-14-4 between those who suffer by reason of a foreign 
object medical malpractice and those who suffer from other 
medical malpractice is not unreasonable nor arbitrary and is 
therefore constitutional. 
The distinction created by S 78-14-4 between claimants 
for wrongful death caused by health care providers and 
claimants for wrongful death caused by non health care 
providers is not unconstitutional. Plaintiff misconstrues 
the holding of Myers v^ McDonald, 635 P.2d 84 (Utah 1981). 
Myers specifically recognizes that in cases of wrongful 
death caused by someone other than a health care provider "a 
cause of action accrues upon the happening of the last event 
necessary to complete the cause of action." Id. at 86. The 
court went on to say that the statute was tolled until the 
fact of death was discovered. ThQHdid not rule that the 
statute was tolled until the cause was discovered. Furthermore, 
Myers was limited to the facts of that case. Therefore, 
wrongful death outside the Health Cjare Malpractice Act and 
wrongful death within the act are both subject to limitation 
periods of two years. Utah Code Ahn. § 78-12-28(2). The 
only time a claimant for wrongful death who falls outside of 
S 78-14-4 is treated more fr drably than one who is covered 
.5- (A-28) 
thereby is in the rare situation when the fact of death is 
unknown. Even this limited distinction is not unconstitutional. 
The Utah Supreme Court has expressly held that the 
creation of a special statute of limitations for health care 
providers., does not violate equal protection under the Utah 
Constitution. Allen v. Intermountain Health Care, Inc., 635 
P.2d 30 (Utah 1981). Although Allen involved a personal 
injury claim rather than wrongful death and was based only 
upon Utah Const, art. I S 24, the equal protection analysis 
of that case is directly applicable to this case under both 
sections 2 and 24 of art. I of the Utah Constitution and the 
Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution. 
Allen effectively outlines the legitimate state interests to 
be achieved by the act which have been discussed supra, and 
explains that the act is reasonably calculated to achieve 
those interests which has also been discussed supra. The 
absolute four year bar established by S 78-14-4 is not 
unconstitutional on the basis of equal protection. 
Although the Utah Supreme Court held in Allen that 
S 78-14-4 was constitutional, they were dealing only with 
the two year statute of limitation and not the four year 
statute of repose and were not faced with the question of 
denial of access to the courts (sometimes referred to as 
open courts). 
In a concurring opinion in Myers, Justice Howe suggests 
that a claimant may unconstitutionally be denied access to 
the courts when he is foreclosed from suing even before the 
injury is ascertainable. 
There is merit to the position of 
refusing to make an exception to 
plain wording of the statute which 
makes no allowance for the legal 
disability of a childr or in this case, 
for learning of the death after the statute 
of limitations had run. We should be careful 
not to encroach upon legislative prerogative. 
However, there may well be a denial of 
constitutional rights in foreclosing persons 
from access to the court under these unusual 
circumstances. 
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Myers v. McDonald, 635 P.2d at 88 (Howe, J., concurring). 
This is the most that has ever been said by the Utah courts 
on this matter. 
Several other states have fouftd similar statutes to be 
constitutional but, like Allen, they were not faced with the 
question of access to the courts. See, e.g., Anderson v. 
Wagner, 79 111. 2d 295, 402 N.E.2d 560 (1979)? Landgraff v^. 
Wagner, 26 Ariz. App. 49f 546 P.2d 26 (1976)? Dunn v^ Felt, 
379 A.2d 1140 (Del. Super. 1977) (^ealth with due process but 
not access)? Owen v. Wilson, 260 Aafk. 21, 537 S.W.2d 543 (1976). 
Georgia, on the other hand, was faced with the access 
question but both the movant and the court treated it as a 
due process claim. Allrid, 285 S«fi.2d at 525. It has long 
been recognized that due process deals with accrued rights. 
Pritchard. v^ Norton, 106 U.S. 124, 132 (1882). It does not 
prevent a legislature from abrogating an unvested right. 
Silver v^ Silver, 280 U.S. 117, 123 (1929). Once the Allrid 
court found the right in question to be unvested its abrogation 
did not violate due process. However, this court questions 
the propriety of treating due process and access as the 
same, at least in states that have both a due process provision 
and an access provision in their constitution. To do so 
would ignore the express language of the provisions and 
create a redundancy. Note, The Utah Product Liability 
Limitation of Action: An Unfair Resolution of Competing 
Concerns, 1979 Utah L. Rev. 149, 156 n.42 (1979) 
Although the effect of a state constitutional open 
court mandate on statutes of repose is uncertain in the 
medical malpractice area, it has been extensively discussed 
in the area of building construction. Several states which 
have identical or similar access provisions as Utah, have 
found their statutes of repose to b£ constitutional. See, 
~
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e.g«, Freezer Storage, Inc. v. Armstrong Cork Co., 476 Pa. 270, 
382 A.2d 715, 721 (Pa. 1978); Reeves v^ Ille Electric Co., 
170 Mont. 104, 551 P.2d 647, 650-51 (1976); Joseph v. Burns, 
491 P.2d 203, 207-08 (Ore. 1971). A reading of these cases 
reveals that they, like Allrid, improperly treated access as 
a due process claim. 
Utah too has found such a statute to be constitutional. 
Good v. Christensen, 527 P.2d 223, 225 (Utah 1974). However, 
the court did not provide any analysis nor did they identify 
the basis of the constitutional challenge. They stated only 
the following: "[t]he plaintiffs also attack the constitutionality 
of the statute, but the claim is without merit." Id. As such, 
the case is of no benefit in deciding the issue before this 
court. 
Both Florida and Kentucky have addressed the access question 
and properly treated access as a distinct guarantee separate 
from due process. Both states found that the statutes of 
repose in question unconstitutionally denied access to the courts. 
Overland Construction Co., Inc. v. Sirmons, 369 So.2d 572 
(Fla. 1979); Saylor v. Hall, 497 S.W.2d 218 (Ky. 1973). 
The difference between these cases and those that find statutes 
of repose constitutional is the finding that the guarantee of 
open courts applies to the legislature as well as the courts 
coupled with the treatment of access as something different than 
due process. Turner, The Counter-Attack to Retake The Citadel 
Continues: An Anaylsis of the Constitutionality of Statutes 
of Repose in Products Liability, 46 J. Air L. & Com. 449, 474-75 
(1981). Once it is determined that access applies only to the 
courts, the legislatures are bound only by the principle of 
due process. As discussed supra, the legislatures are then 
free to abolish any right which has not yet vested or is not 
protected by the constitution. Even if the open courts guarantee 
is found to be applicable to legislatures the ensuing result 
8 U~31 
would be the same if the guarantee is treated like due process. 
It has already been stated that this court views due 
process and access as being two distinct guarantees« The question 
then becomes whether the access guarantee of the Utah Constitution 
applies tg the Utah legislature. This question has been answered 
affirmatively. Brown v. Wightman, 47 Utah 31, 151 P. 366, 
366-67 (1915); Lewis v^ Pingree National Bank, 47 Utah 35, 
151 P. 558, 565 (1915). These two conclusions place Utah on 
the side of Florida and Kentucky. This however does not ipso 
facto mean that § 78-14-4 unconstitutionally denies certain 
claimaints access to the courts. 
The Supreme Court of Florida recognized that the requirements 
of society, and the ever-evolving Character of the law make an 
absolute prohibition against legislative change untenable. 
Kluger v. White, 281 So.2d 1, 4 (Fia. 1973). Balancing this 
against the open courts guarantee they have held that 
•the Legislature is without power to 
abolish such a right without providing 
a reasonable alternative to protect the 
rights of the people of the State to 
redress for injuries, unless the Legislature 
can show an overpowering public necessity 
for the abolishment of such a right, and 
no alternative method of meeting such public 
necessity can be shown.' 
Overland Construction Co., Inc. v. Sirmons, 369 So.2d at 573. 
This is the standard to be used in determining whether S 78-14-4 
is unconstitutional. 
Section 78-14-2 of the Utah Code sets forth the purpose 
of the Health Care Malpractice Act and the legislative findings 
and declarations relating thereto. In passing the act, the 
legislature was responding to a medical malpractice crisis that 
was causing the cost of health carfe to increase to the point that 
it threatened to be available only to the rich. Comments An 
Analysis of State Legislative Responses to the Medical Malpractice 
Crisis, 1975 Duke L.J. 1417 (1975), The legislature also found 
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that the quality of that care had diminished because health care 
providers, in response to the numerous suits being filed, were 
practicing defensive medicine rather than providing the best 
care possible. The overpowering public necessity of making 
available the best health care possible justifies the abolition 
of the right to access to the courts in medical malpractice 
cases four years after the occurrence of the act, omission, 
neglect or occurrence which caused the injury. The legislature 
balanced the conflicting interests and determined that there 
was no less onerous alternative for alleviating the crisis. 
Therefore, § 78-14-4 does not violate article I, section 11 
of the Utah Constitution. 
Although this court finds § 78-14-4 to be constitutional, 
this case cannot be dismissed. An exception to the statute 
is provided when health care providers fraudulently conceal 
their negligence as has been alleged by plaintiff. Utah Code 
Ann. S 78-14-4(1)(b). Whether or not defendant fraudulently 
concealed the alleged negligence is a fact question which 
cannot be decided on the record before this court. 
Accordingly, 
IT IS ORDERED that plaintiff's motion to strike the third 
defense of defendants answer is denied. 
Dated this /&* day of August, 1982. 
\\U<JIMJJ^^^\ 
David K. Winder 
United States District Judge 
Mailed a copy of the foregoing Memorandum Decision and Order 
to the following named counsel this 7 " day of August, 1982. 
W. Brent Wilcox, Esq. 
Scott A. Call, Esq. 
600 Deseret Plaza 
No. 15 East First south 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Stewart M. Hanson, Jr., Esq. 
Francis J. Carney, Esq. 
17 5 South West Temple, Seventh Floor 
Salt Lake City, utah 84101 
^ ^ #* <£M0 
Secretary 
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